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Abstract. In the dominant view of knowledge bases (KB's), a KB is a set of facts (atomic sentences) and 
integrity constraints (IC's). An IC is then a sentence which must at least be consistent with the other 
sentences in the KB. This view obliterates the distinction between, for example, the constraint that age is a 
natural number (which is true of the universe of discourse (UoD) but may be false in a particular 
implementation f a KB), and the constraint that a class must have precisely one teacher (which is false of 
the UoD if a class actually has two teachers). The second constraint iscalled deontic and constrains the UoD; 
the first constraint is a necessary truth of the UoD and does not constrain the UoD. Instead, it constrains the 
implementation f the KB. We argue that the distinction between ecessary and deontic IC's is relevant for 
KB modeling and that it imposes a more complicated modeling discipline on the KB designer than hitherto 
realized. We show that both types of constraints can be specified in the single framework provided by a 
deontic variant of dynamic logic, which has the added advantage of being able to specify dynamic onstraints 
as well. We give a simple example to illustrate the difference between dynamic and static specification of 
deontic IC's, and a non-trivial example of a KB specification with static, dynamic and deontic constraints. 
Keywords. Constraints, Deontic logic, Dynamic logic, Conceptual modelling. 
0. Ihtroduction 
In current research in data- and knowledge bases, a number of different model concepts 
are Used. The oldest and most explicit is the concept of a model as a database schema, which 
is roughly a set of relation definitions with some integrity constraints. We argue that this view 
is insufficient for an adequate representation f IC's, especially when the knowledge base is 
used to represent rules which the UoD should obey. By adopting the standard view of 
mOdels from the philosophy of natural science, we show that some IC's currently en- 
couqtered in the literature are analogous to analytical truths or to empirical laws of nature, 
but that many IC's cannot be so classified. Where analytical and empirical truths can be used 
to C~nstrain the implementation in the sense that the implementation cannot be in a state (or 
can¢ot execute a state transition) which violates these constraints, there is a large class of 
other IC's which constrain the UoD, not the implementation f the KB. An example of such 
a COnstraint is that a library user ought to return a book or renew the lending period within 
three weeks of borrowing the book. This is a constraint on the UoD which can be violated by 
the IJoD and the implementation f the KB must be able to represent such a violation. We 
call this class of constraints deontic (~eo~r~o~ (Greek)= "as it should be, duly"). 
Ill section 1.1 we argue that the standard escriptive model concept as it is used in natural 
science is applicable to KB's. We then show in Section 1.2 that this allows us to distinguish 
six types of IC in terms of the states and events obtaining in the UoD and which therefore 
are completely implementation-independent. Four types of IC can be defined wholly in 
ternls of the standard models concept of natural science. Two other types require an 
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extension of this model concept with prescriptive lements, as shown in Section 1.3. In 1.4 
we briefly point out some simplifications we make with respect o social UoD's 
While Chapter 1 is language-independent, Chapter 2 shows how to express the six types of 
constraint in a deontic extension of dynamic logic. Section 2.1 formally defines our view of 
constraint satisfaction, and Sections 2.2-2.4 define a language for the different ypes of 
constraints distinguished in Chapter 1. In Chapter 3 we summarize the results and point out 
some topics for future research. 
1. Descriptive and prescriptive models in knowledge base systems 
1.1. Descriptive models 
To understand the classification of integrity constraints in static constraints, dynamic 
constraints and deontic constraints we must have clear view of the role of models in the 
design and use of knowledge bases (KB's). The view of models presented in this section is 
mostly taken from natural science. To distinguish it from another type of model to be 
discussed below, we will call this type of model descriptive. Although the nature and role of 
descriptive models in natural science is not fully understood, i it suffices for our purposes to 
adopt the following definition. 
Definition 1. A descriptive model of a UoD is an abstract system which represents the 
entities in the UoD and their behavior at a certain level of approximation. The system has a 
state space and a state transition function which describes how it can move through its state 
space. 
Several concepts in this definition need elucidation. 
1. The UoD of a knowledge base (KB) is usually a social system like (part of) an 
enterprise but may also be a technical reality like a system of elevators. 
2. A descriptive model represents the UoD. What it is to represent part of reality is left 
unexplicated in this papel'. It essentially involves being able to say that the model is true 
of the UoD or that the representation is correct, given a certain level of abstraction (cf. 
the references in note 1). 
3. A descriptive model is abstract, by which is meant that parts of the UoD are not 
modeled at all, and that of those parts which are modeled irrelevant details are not 
represented. Put differently, the model approximates the UoD to a certain degree, bu 
looked at close enough discrepancies will be found where the model can be said to be 
an incorrect or incomplete representation f the UoD. In natural science, one studies 
ideal point masses and ideal gases which represent real masses and gases only to a 
degree of approximation. In KB's, a similar idealization takes place. For example, if we 
must represent the color of John's eyes as either blue or green, but they actually are 
blue-green, then we must approximate he real-world situation by representing John as 
having either blue or green eyes. Neither representation is correct, if we take the 
difference between blue, blue-green and green into account. And if we do not 
represent all of John's properties (KB's will in general not represent all properties of 
real-world objects) then in this sense the KB is an incomplete model of the UoD. 
4. We view a model as a system in the sense of systems theory, which in the context of KB 
applications i roughly equivalent to the concept of machine in automata theory. That 
is, a model is a set of state variables whose values define a point in a state space and a 
~See Harr~ [17], Hesse [18], Nagel [39], Suppe [49] and Suppes [50] for a discussion. 
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state transition function which assigns a (next-state, output) pair to each (state, input) 
pair. (In nondeterministic systems there is a set of (next-state, output) pairs for each 
(state, input) pair.). We only look at discrete-valued state variables, so that we may talk 
of a state transition function (as opposed to a state evolution ftinction). 
In the database community what is meant by "model" is usually a database schema, e.g. a 
set of relation definitions and integrity constraints. A relation schema comes close to what is 
called a signature in formal logic, a list of symbols used in a formal language L and for each 
predicate symbol its arity and possibly the types of its arguments. By contrast, we use the 
concept of a model primarily as it is used in natural science. 2 In this sense, each UoD entity e 
is represented by an abstract object o which is a model of e. (Speaking of the UoD, we talk 
about entities and speaking of abstract representations of the UoD, we talk about objects). In 
Fig. 1, the abstract objects o~ and 02 represent employees e I and e 2, so they are models of e~ 
and e 2. Usually, the state variables of an object are called its attributes. The attributes of an 
object span a state space of dimensionality n, where n is the total number of attributes 
applicable to the object. At a higher level of aggregation, the KB itself is a model of the 
UoD because it is a set of abstract objects, each of which is a model of a UoD entity. Thus 
{0 ! , 02} is a database which represents information about e ! and e 2. A state of the database 
is characterized by giving 1. the set of abstract objects which exist in that database state and 
2. the state of each existing object. The assumption here is that the UoD is in states which 
can be abstractly represented by states of the model and similarly that the entities in the 
UoD have states which can be represented by states of abstract objects. 
Each system has a state transition function, and representation of object dynamics is 
currently an active research topic. To specify the state transition function of a model, we 
must specify update events (single state transitions) and processes (composed of sequences, 
choices, or parallel executions of update events). When a set of objects forms a database, 
they usually exchange messages, which greatly complicates the specification of the state 
transition function of the database. Wieringa and van de Riet [5] show how to use process 
algebra to specify the processes executed by individual objects as well as by a database (see 
Bergstra and Klop [3, 4] for process algebra). Below we will use dynamic logic to specify 
object and database dynamics. 
We distinguish in Fig. 1 between the model of a UoD, which is an abstract KB and an 
implementation 
~- Oi 02 [ 
-I ~ ~ model 
I 
' ~  UoD 
Fig. 1. Objects and entities. 
2Other uses of the word "model" are: 1. a class of signatures with a certain structure, as for example in "the 
relational data model," the functional data model;" 2. a particular state of a model in our sense of the word, i.e. a 
instance of a database chema (snapshot fa database). 
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implementation f the model, which is a concrete KB on a particular machine. The arrows in 
Fig. 1 will be explained later. In an implementation, an object is represented by a record 
consisting of a unique key and a tuple of attribute values. In this paper we concern ourselves 
with KB's as models of the UoD. 
The physical sense of "model" can be connected with the logical sense of "model" which 
is common in database theory (Nicolas and Gallaire [41]). The model in Fig. 1 is an abstract 
structure into which a formal language L is interpreted. There is a set T of sentences in L 
which are true of the model, which is called a theory of the model. Following Reiter [44], we 
will use theories which have as only model their term-model divided b~, a suitable 
equivalence relation. That model is an abstract representation of the UoD. We thus take a 
model-theoretic view of KB's (as opposed to a KB as a set of sentences true to a model), 
taking the word "model" in two senses: as abstract representation f the UoD and as logical 
model of a set of sentences. Below we will extend this with a third sense, a model as a 
prescription for a UoD. 
Our language L will be a deontic extension of dynamic logic (Harel [16], Meyer 
[34, 35, 3o]), and our models will all be Kripke structures. Using the jargon of modal logic, 
the state space of a KB will often be called a set of possible worlds and a particular KB state 
is one possible world (Hughes and CressweU [22]). We quantify over a single domain of 
possible objects, and we use the existence predicate E to express existence of an object in a 
world. If one uses an existence predicate E, to give the state of a KB one should give 1. the 
extension of E and 2. the extension of all other predicates and/or functions. A state 
transition function can be defined as an accessibility relation between worlds. 
1.2. Integrity constraints 
Definition 2. For a given logical language L and a class ~ of intended models, an integrity 
constraint (IC) of a KB ~t E ~ is a sentence ~ in L such that ~t ~ ~,. 
We again explain the main points in this definition. 
1. The class of intended models of L are all Kripk¢ structures consisting of a set of 
possible worlds (states). These states are not abstractions of machine states, but of UoD 
states. 
2. A sentence is a closed formula. We thus take a very liberal view of IC's, since even an 
atomic sentence (of the form P(c j , . . . ,  c,) where P is a predicate and c i are constants 
of L) is an IC if it is true in JR. But note that ~ ~ P(c~,..., c.) iff it is true in all 
states of the model. Our liberal view of IC's includes also constraints like 
P(xt , . . . ,  xn) v "aP(x~,..., Xn) , but at least it does not e~:clude anything from the 
status of IC which we should include. 
3. ~ is called a constraint only for historical reasons. As will be shown in a moment, some 
IC's constrain the implementation of a KB but not the KB itself, others constrain the 
KB but not the implementation, and still others do not constrain anything but are 
empirical generalizations. 
Our definition is the model-theoretic analogue of the standard view of IC's (Kung [27], 
Nicolas and GaUaire [41], Nicolas and Yazdanian [42], Nicolas [40], Reiter [44]). What is not 
commonly realized in the literature is that this view implies that an IC is a necessary truth in 
the model. In modal logic a necessary truth is defined as truth in all possible worlds. This 
seems to be at odds with the status of a constraint like age < 150, which is not necessarily 
true in the UoD at all. Again, the statement that each course is taught by one teacher only is 
not a necessary truth either, since it can be violated, so by the above definition it is not an 
integrity constraint. These two puzzles can be solved by the following classification of IC's 
(See also yon Wright [53] for a comparable classification of modalities.) 
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The constraint age E N is an analytical statement, i.e. one which follows from the meaning 
of the symbols occurring in it, and is therefore a necessary truth) This has two important 
consequences concerning IC change and constraint violation. 
1. A change of an analytical constraint is a change of the meaning of some of the symbols 
occurring in it. For example, we may decide to measure temperature in degrees Kelvin 
instead of degrees centigrade. The constraints temp E R then becomes temp E R A 
temp >~ 0 (by definition, degrees Kelvin start at 0). 4 
2. An analytical constraint can be used to check if the current state of the implementation 
implements a possible world. If in the implementation a record has a negative value int 
is age field, the implementation does not represent a possible world. (If the im- 
plementation represents a possible world, it may represent the correct world.) Thus, an 
analytical IC constrains the implementation but not the KB since it i.s necessarily true of 
the KB. 
Consider now the attribute age of human beings, measured in years, subject o the constraint 
that age <~ 150. This is not a necessary truth at all but depends upon contingent factors like 
the state of our general health. It is an empirical truth about our UoD which our model, as 
an abstraction of the UoD, should satisfy. The situation is analogous to empirical aws in 
natural science. Like the famous Boyle/Caries law for" ideal gases PV/T= C, the law 
age <<- 150 defines a subset of the total set of logically possible states of the world. 
1. Barring change of meaning, a change of empirical constraint is a change in the way the 
UoD behaves. 
2. If the implementation violates an empirical constraint, the implementation or the 
constraint may be in error. The rub is that we (should) choose empirical constraints so 
weak that any violation can be reasonably be taken to be an implementation error. 
That is, we only use empirical IC's which during the life of the KB we can reasonably 
treat as if they were necessary truths. 5That is what usually happens in the literature. 
There is a third type of constraint which figures largely in the literature. An example from 
Nicolas and Yazdanian [42] is the constraint that in a university database, only one teacher 
teaches a course. This is not an analtyical truth which explicates a meaning relation between 
"teacher", "teaching" and "course," nor is it an empirical generalization about the way 
teachers, students and courses happen to behave, but it is a rule instituted by agents in the 
UoD to constrain the possible states of the UoD. We will call these constraints deontic. Like 
empirical constraints, deontic constraints can be violated by the UoD. But where in the case 
of empirical constraints this is a novel way for the UoD to behave which is logically possible 
and ethically neutral, in the case of a deontic constraint it is a case of behavior which is 
logically and physically possible but ethically inadmissible. 
1. A change of a deontic constraint is a change in the norms pertaining to the UoD. For 
example, we may decide to allow more than one teacher per course. 
2. A deontic constraint can be used to check if the agents in the UoD behave in a 
permissible way. With the constraint in hand, proper action can be taken if two 
3See Kripke [25, 26] for subtle differences between ecessity and analicity. At least he statement that all 
analytical statements are necessarily true emerges as a necessary truth from that discussion. 
4We should note here the difficulties of finding a criterion which distinguishes analytical statements, whose 
truth-value can be determined by an analysis of the meanings of the symbols occurring in it, from empirical 
statements. Analytical statements are immune to falsification and empirical statements are not. However as Quine 
argues, immunity to falsification is not a property of a statement i  isolation but depends, among other things, on 
the degree of entrenchment of he statement in a theory. See Davidson [5], Quine [43]. Suppe [49] gives a good 
summary. 
Sin other approaches, mpirical IC's are formulated in a more defeasible way as default knowledge rules. This 
requires a nonmonotonic logic. We don't open this can of worms here. 
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teachers are found to teach the same course. Deontic IC's do not constrain the 
implementation, but the UoD (and hence the KB). The implementation must be able 
to implement a KB which violates deontic constraints. 
Thus, even if we ignore a change of rules governing a UoD, the statement that each course 
has one teacher is not a necessary truth of a model of a UoD where people can violate the 
rules. But the statement that there exists the rule that each course should have one teacher is 
a necessary truth in such a model. Of course, if we allow change of rules, the statement may 
lose its necessary characer. We simplify the treatment of dynamics by considering only 
change of facts and not change of rules. 
We summarize the distinctions between the three types of constraint in the following 
definition. 
Definition 3. An IC is analytical iff its truth follows from the (intuitive) meaning of the 
symbols occurring in it, it is empirical iff it states a generalization about the UoD, and it is 
deontic iff it expresses a norm with which the UoD must comply. 6
We have not distinguished static from dynamic constraints, since the above distinctions are 
applicable to both types of constraints. We can define the distinction if we view a KB as a set 
of possible worlds. 
Definition 4. An IC is static if it is true of each possible UoD state, and it is dynamic if at 
least two states are needed to verify its truth. 
Table 1 shows some examples of the different types of constraint. 
Remarks. 
1. Our example of a dynamic empirical constraint can also be construed eontically as a 
rule for student behavior. It depends on where the blame is allocated when the rule is 
violated: with the student violating the rule (so that the rule is deontic) or with the 
person formulating the rule (so that it is an empirical generalization). 
2. It is very hard to find empirical dynamic constraints in social UoD's with the same 
degree of inviolability as our example of a static empirical constraint. Virtually all 
empirical generalizations in social science are statistical and can therefore not be used 
to detect illegal state transitions of a computer. 
3. Note that deontic constraints have a strong dynamical flavor, since if state w is 
inadmissible, then every transition from a permissible state to w is forbidden. For 
Table 1. 
Static Dynamic 
Analytical age E ~ An employee must be 
hired before s/he can be 
fired. 
Empirical 
Deontic 
age < 150 
The balance of a bank 
account should not be 
less than n. 
All students follow CI01 
before they do A105. 
A library user should return 
a borrowed book 
after at most 6 weeks. 
~The relation between these three classes of statements (and even the validity of the classification) is subject of 
age-old philosophical controversy. For our pragmatic purposes we can ignore this controversy. 
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example, because the balance of a bank account may not be less than n, any transition 
to such a state is forbidden. Moreover, obligations are wholly dynamical, since they 
concern actions, not states. 
In our view, the KB is an abstract object whose state is determined by 1. the set of abstract 
objects which ,=~.:~;: in that state and 2. the state of each existing object. The KB executes a
process wich consists of 1. creation and destruction of abstract objects and 2. the parallel 
execution of subprocesses by existing objects. Static constraints express truths about all 
possible KB states, and dynamic constraints specify the process executed by the KB and its 
objects7 This is a view which differs markedly from the view of a KB as a set of sentences. 
Our view of a KB as an abstract model of the UoD has uncovered six types of IC's with 
crucially different characteristics. A simple way to find out how to classify an IC is by 
allocating the culprit in case of violation. If violation is a mistake of the implementation but 
cannot occur in the UoD, then it is a necessary constraint. If violation can occur in the UoD 
and should be corrected in the UoD, then we have a deontic constraint. If violation can 
occur in the UoD but it is a creative behavior on the part of the UoD, then we have an 
empirical constraint and the mistake is in our representation f the UoD: we have made a 
mistake in an empirical generalization about the UoD. 
Note that by definition of IC, all IC's are necessary truths. This may seem confusing in the 
case of deontic constraints, which we have pointed out may be violated. In the next section 
we clarify this point. For now, we conclude that our language L must contain syntactic 
constructs which express ix different types of IC's. In Chapter 2, we show that a deontic 
variant of dynamic logic fits these requirements. 
We note in passing that the implementation of a KB can be in more states than the model 
it implements and that it can execute more state transitions than are possible in the model. 
Some of these extra states are needed to implement the model; others are considered to be 
error states. Similarly, some implementation events (or subprocesses) are needed to simulate 
events in the model; others are erroneous. One of the implementation events must therefore 
be an error correction event, which maps an error state which does not represent a possible 
world to a state representing a possible world. For example, we need an undo event which 
restores the implementation to a state before an incorrect implementation event occurred. 
Error correction is not the topic of this paper because by definition the KB itself, as opposed 
to its implementation, cannot be in error. By contrast, 1he KB must be able to represent a
state which violates a deontic constraint and for each forbidden state it must be able to 
execute a violation correction event which takes it from a forbidden to permissible state. We 
study such events below. 
1.3. Prescriptive models 
In order to understand eontic IC's, it is essential to understand the relation between a 
model containing deontic IC's and the UoD. Deontic constraints are not descriptions of but 
prescriptions for the UoD. The simple picture of a KB as a descriptive model painted in 
Section 1.1 must therefore be extended to cover the prescriptive aspect of KB's. The 
distinction between a descriptive and a prescriptive model can be made using the concept of 
direction of fit, which we borrow, in adapted form, from speech act theory (Searle [46], 
Searle and Vanderveken [47]). 
7Just as empirical static onstraints are analogous towhat are called laws of coexistence in the philosophy of 
science, so empirical dynamic constraints, which describe how abstract objects change their state, are analogous to
what are called laws of change, like F = m.a (van Fraassen [12]). Because our dynamic constraints also state how 
the abstract objects composing the abstract KB object interact, empirical dynamic constraints also include laws of 
interaction, which say how entities interact with each other when they are composed into larger systems. 
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Definition 5. The direction of fit between two entities is an arrow which points to the entity 
to which the other entity must adjust itself in case there is a mismatch between the two. If 
the direction of fit is from A to B, then B is called normative for A. 
This definition presupposes that there is a meaningful concept of matching between the 
two entities. In this paper we encounter two such concepts: mismatch between description 
and described, and mismatch between prescription and the entity whose behavior is 
prescribed. In each case, the direction of fit is in the direction in which we can find "the 
boss," which is the entity to whom the other must adjust. 
The definition does not intend to exhaust or even approximate the concept of ~ermativity. 
Explication of this concept is outside the province of computer science. 
We can now see that a descriptive model of the UoD has a direction of fit from model to 
UoD (see Definition 1). The unbroken arrows in figure 1 indicate direction of fit. The 
direction of fit from T to the model reflects the fact that in our view T, as a theory of the 
model, must be adapted to changes in the model (which in turn must adapt itself to changes 
in the UoD). 8 The UoD model is explicated before there is a formal theory which describes 
it. In KB design, we thus look for IC's which describe a model of the UoD, instead of 
looking for a model into which we can interpret IC's. The direction of fit between an 
implementation and a model is from implementation to model, so that each implemented 
descriptive model plays two roles: it is a description of a UoD but a prescription for an 
implementation. The dotted arrows in figure 1 indicate direction of abstraction. 
Definition 6. A prescriptive model for a UoD is a system whose states and behavior is 
normative for the UoD. 
Note that we speak of a prescriptive model for a UoD, in contrast o a descriptive model of a 
UoD. Where descriptive models are used in natural science, which studies systems as they 
are found in nature, engineering science, which studies the construction of systems which 
satisfy the demands of a prescriptive model, uses prescriptive a~ well as descriptive models. 
The relation between the two kinds of models as used in engineering science is shown in Fig. 
2. 
Note that M o is a descriptive model of M e. The distinction corresponds to the two ways of 
interpreting "It is forbidden to park here," as the promulgation of a rule or as the 
observation that a rules exists (yon Wright [52], p. 93). 
Mo: descriptive model 
of prescriptive model 
for UoD 
M A: descriptive model 
of UoD 
Fig. 2. Prescriptive and descriptive models in engineering science. 
8This is a simplification i  as far as decisions made in the design of L may influence the UoD, and thus the model. 
There may be a double direction of fit between parts of L and the model. See Section 1,4 for a discussion. 
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To illustrate the difference between the three models shown in Fig. 2, consider what 
happens in case of mismatch along each of the three arrows in Fig. 2. If there is a mismatch 
along arrow 1, M A is wrong and must be adjusted. If there is a mismatch along arrow 2, we 
try to adapt the UoD to fit the prescriptive model. But if this turns out to be impossible, or 
too expensive, or will take too much time, we will adapt our norms, i.e. scale down the 
prescriptive model so that the demands on the UoD are not so exacting. For example, when 
we discover during the model-building phase that the cost of living up to all requirements on 
an elevator system is too high, we may reduce the requirements concerning the quality of 
elevator service. This makes the situation in engineering science more flexible and therefore 
more complex: in case of mismatch between prescriptive model and actual UoD, we may 
adapt either the UoD or the model. This does not affect the direction of fit between the 
prescriptive model and the actual UoD, as Fig. 3 shows. When we adapt our norms to what 
is attainable, we replace a prescriptive model by another prescriptive model to which the 
actual UoD stands in the same direction of fit. 
Taking arrow 3 into account, the situation becomes even more complex. In case of 
mismatch between the behavior of M 3 and the actual UoD, we must find our whether we 
incorrectly modeled the prescriptive model (mismatch along arrow 3) or whether the actual 
UoD fails to live up to the requirements (mismatch along arrow 2). In the first case, we 
should improv~ M r,  in the second we should either improve the actual UoD or scale down 
M r • 
To illustrate these ideas, take the simulation of queues at counters in a supermarket. If we 
simulate the queues as they actually occur, the simulation is an implementation f M A. If we 
compare this simulation with some required behavior Mp, we formulate this behavior in 
terms of the available parameters to get M D and then compare M o and M A. What we have 
not shown in Fig. 3 is that usually we have many MA's  of different possible parameter 
settings. We then optimize by choosing the best simulation or by scaling down the 
requirements, if they prove to be too demanding. Note that after we agree on an optimal 
simulation, the simulated escriptive model M A then becomes an M r for the UoD. 
The distinction between M/~ and M r allows us to understand why deontic IC's are on the 
one hand necessary statements which, on the other, can be violated. A deontic statement, 
interpreted as a statement about M r, is a promulgated norm for the behavior of the UoD 
and as such can be violated by the actual behavior of objects in the UoD. On the other hand, 
descriptive model 
of prescriptive model 
for UoD 
MD: descriptive model 
of scaled-down norms 
A: descriptive model 
of UoD 
I 
Fig. 3. Adapting the prescriptive model to what is attainable. 
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interpreted formally as a statement about M r ,  it is a necessary truth about a set of possible 
worlds and cannot be violated by the behavior of objects in those worlds. If it is forbidden to 
park here, then, ignoring change in the parking rules, it is in all states of the world the case 
that it is forbidden to park here and as such the rule is necessarily true in all possible states 
of the world. Nevertheless, actual drivers can violate the rule and park here. 
The distinction between M D and Mp allows us to express a second important fact about 
deontic IC's. It expresses the fact that M o is an abstraction of Mp. That is, many norLns 
pertaining to the UoD are simply not represented in M o. 
If we want to represent deontic constraints in a KB alongside with descriptive constraints, 
we get the situation of Fig. 4. An example of this is a library administration, which 
represents the current state of affairs in its role as M A ("John has borrowed a book") and 
represents the required state of affairs in its role as M D ("John should return the book within 
6 weeks"). 
Insertion of an implementation i to the UoD adds complications, as is shown in Fig. 5. We 
have actually three cases, implementing M A, implementing M D, and implementing MA,Qo. 
Implementation of M A alone requires that M A contain a model of the implementation, 
because it is a part of the UoD. This part of the descriptive model is usually called a data 
dictionary. Implementing M A, we can connect the implementation to the rest of the UoD 
and get a registrative system. To add control, we must also implement part of M o, in order 
to have a standard against which to measure actual behavior. 
Implementation of M o alone happens a lot in engineering, for example in the building of 
airplanes. The designer starts with a list of desiderata (Mp) for actual behavior and models 
these desiderata in the specification of an airplane. This specification is a model M D of the 
desiderata which acts as a prescription for the airplane. Consider now what happens if the 
plane is built according to specification but does not behave as desired. It may be the case 
that it does not implement he specification correctly (error along arrow 4), or that the 
specification does not model the list of desiderata correctly (error along arrow 3) or that the 
desiderata re unrealistic (M~, is empty). Each of these cases requires a different corrective 
action. (In reality, of course, the process iterates, usually over scale models or computer 
models, in order to adjust M t, and Mt~ to what is possible and desirable.) 
Finally, if we implement MA,~t , entirely, we have the advantage that in addition to 
registration we can add a feedback loop for control, but we have the added complexity of the 
many directions of fit which we get by implementing Mr,. An example is a program which 
controls missiles. Using a model MA of the missile and input from sensors to the UoD, it 
compares actual behavior with an implementation of an abstract model MD of desired 
MAyo: descriptive model 
of UoD and M e 
Fig. 4. Merging descriptive models. 
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Fig. 5. Implementing and using a model in the UoD. 
behavior, and outputs commands to the UoD via effectors to adjust the actual behavior of 
the UoD. The assumption is, of course, that the mismatch between actual behavior 
measured by the implementation a d the desired behavior as known to the system is along 
arrow 2 and that the program correctly implements MA and M D, which in turn correctly 
model the UoD and M D, and M e is a realistic model for the behavior of the missile. 
1.4. Models of social UoD's 
We have taken examples from social UoD's as well as non-social UoD's. In this section we 
add a few words about special features of social UoD's. One feature is that we cannot 
mechanically connect effectors to the people in the UoD in order to control their behavior. 
People are subject to ethics, and the norms regulating a social UoD have an ethical 
dimension. This dimension is not captured by the formal logic of norms, which applies to 
ethical as well as non-ethical norms, but turns up in the actual behavior of the UoD as well 
as in the degree to which the actual behavior can be influenced. In social UoD's deviations 
from normal behavior will more frequently occur and will persist longer than in non-social 
UoD's controlled by a mechanical feedback loop. A KB should thus be able to represent 
more deviations and should allow for the fact that corrective measures do not have effect, 
piling deviation upon deviation. 
A second feature of social UoD's is that the state of the UoD may be changed simply by 
representing that change to have taken place. For example, money may be added to a bank 
account by simply altering a figure in a record in an implementation. There are two ways of 
looking at this update. In one view, the update mirrors a change which took place in the real 
world. In another view we make the performative assumption that the update is a change of 
the state of the UoD (cf. Lee [28]). The relation between the part of M D containing the 
account balance and the UoD is one of double direction of fit. The UoD is in a certain state 
because M D represents it to be so. This phenomenon occurs frequently in social contexts. For 
example, a chairperson opens a meeting by declaring it to be opened and authorities close an 
area for the public by declaring it to be closed. In each case, the agent performing the action 
causes a state by declaring it to be the case, and in each case, only certain agents can do this, 
and they must do this in a certain way (cf. Searle and Vanderveken [47], Lehtinen and 
Lyytinen [29], Auram/iki et al. [2]). 
Note that making the performative assumption about an action is itself a performative act. 
A action is performative by declaring it to be so. 
The logic of performatives will not be studied in this paper. In Chapter 2 we concentrate 
on the specification of IC's, in particular deontic IC's. 
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2. Specification of integrity constraints 
2.1. Constraint satisfiability 
IC's are sentences (Definition 2) which the KB must satisfy. There are at least two views 
of satisfaction of an integrity constraint by a KB (Reiter [45]). Continuing to view a KB as a 
model of a set of sentences, according to the consistency view of IC satisfaction, KB satisfies 
IC iff KB can be extended to a model of IC. In the entailment view, on the other hand, KB 
satisfies IC iff it is a model of IC 9. As Reiter notes, the problem with the consistency view is 
that in this view the constraint 
Vx(Emp(x) ~ ::ly(ss#(x, y))) IC0 
would be satisfied by a KB where the predicate Emp has extension Mary and the extension 
of ss# is empty. This model can be extended to a model of IC0 by adding an unnamed 
object o such that the tuple (Mary, o) is in the extension of ss#. However, like Reiter [44], 
we do not accept unnamed objects. 
The problem with the entailment view is that the empty model is a model of IC0, for 
trivially all employee objects in that model have a social security number. In our model- 
theoretic view of KB's it is natural to define IC satisfaction as satisfaction (in the standard 
logical sense) of a formula by a structure. We eliminate the problem of emply models by 
requiring the KB to be a non-empty model of IC. 
Definition 7. For a given logical anguage L with a class ~ of ir~tended models, let IC be (the 
conjunction of) a collection of integrity constraints expressed in L. 
1. The constraint satisfiability problem is the problem of checking whether IC is satisfiable, 
i.e. whether there is a non-empty model ~t E ~ such that ~ ~ IC. 
2. The constraint validation problem for a KB ~ E ~ is the problem of checking whether 
Thus the constraint satisfiability problem is a general problem about the internal consistency 
of a set of constraints, whereas the validation problem concerns the issue whether a 
particular KB is a model of IC. The problems exist for analytical, empirical and deontic 
constraints and for each of these, for static as well as dynamic onstraints. It depends on the 
choice of language L which of these types of constraints can be expressed. 
The constraint satisfiability problem is usually called the constraint verification problem in 
the literature. We do not use this term because, first, there already is a perfectly acceptable 
term from logic and, second, in our view verification should be construed as the problem of 
checking whether the KB is an accurate abstraction of the UoD, just as in natural science 
verification is testing a model against a UoD. 
We take it to be part of constraint specification to check whether the constraints are 
satisfiable. In the next section we show in outline how one can go about showing the 
satisfiability of a set of constraints. The constraint validation problem, on the other hand, is a 
problem to be attacked by tile implementation f a KB. 
Note that with respect o an implementation f a KB in a finite machine, we may want to 
take the consistency view of IC satisfaction and view some IC's as derivation rules for the 
implementation. A derivation rule is used to deduce new information from stored informa- 
tion and can therefore be used to save on storage (Nicolas and Gallaire [41], Nicolas and 
~Viewing KB as a set of sentences, the consistency view is that KB U IC is satisfiable and the entailment view is 
that any model of KB must be a model of IC, 
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Yazdanian [42]). Because our abstract model is potentially infinite but any implementation is 
finite, we require of an implementation merely that it can be extended to a model of the 
theory. The implementation must be consistent with the IC's but need not (and often 
cannot) itself be a model of the IC's. 
2.2. Static necessary constraints 
Static analytical and empirical constraints can be expressed in the usual way in any first 
order language. In order to prepare for the dynamic and deontic extensions later on, we now 
fix a language Lstat by giving its syntax, a semantics, proof rules and axioms. 
Syntax 
We do not actually give the variables of Lstat but use the letters x, y and z (possibly 
indexed) as metavariables over the variables. Constants are A101, 1234,.. .  and the letter c 
(possibly indexed) is used as metavariable over the constants. There are infinitely many 
variables and constants. There are finitely many function symbols, with metavariables f, 
g , . . .  Function symbols with arity 0 are constants. Supplier, Emp, . . .  are predicate symbols 
and the letters P, Q, R are used as metavariables over the predicate symbols. Each predicate 
symbol has an arity >0. Two special predicates are the unary predicate E (existence) and the 
binary predicate =(equality). There is a class of distinguished unary predicates, not including 
E, called type predicates. Type predicates are used to indicate basic kinds of things, like 
Emp, Book, Dept etc. (cf. Reiter [44], p. 195). Formulas are built in the usual way using ^ ,  
v, -'1, ==>, V, 3, and punctuation symbols ( ,) ,  [and ]. We use infix notation for =. 
Metavariables over formulas are & and 0. The following abbreviations are used: 
E A 
V x(~(x))C~Vx(E(x)=~ t~(x)) and 
 x(E(x) ^  
Semantics 
Although we have given the syntax of a first-order language without modal operators, we 
give a semantics in terms of a Kripke structure. In order to eliminate problems with 
unnamable objects in models, which may exist in the consistency view of IC satisfaction, we 
use universes in which all objects are named. Such universes can be built from the constants 
in the language by a Herbrand construction. 
Definition 8. A function symbol f of adty n > 1 is called transparent with respect o a model 
M of L if for any constants c~, . . . ,  c n, there is a constant Co such that M ~ f(cl,. • •, cn) - 
C O • 
lf f is transparent then if the arguments of a particular application are known (in the sense of 
having a name), then the result of application is known. In any expression, function 
applications to constants can thus be eliminated. 
Definition 9. For any language L, 
1. the Herbrand universe U L of L is the set of cons~ats of L. (Since we consider only 
languages with transparent function symbols, it is sufficient o consider a Herbrand 
universe without function symbols.) 
2. The Herbrand base ~.  of L is the set of all ground atoms (closed atomic formulas) of 
L. 
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3. A Herbrand model AI L is a subset A/L C: ~/ .  Truth in ~/ ,  is defined for ground atoms 
as  
-'f~i~ P(c, . . . . .  c,,)¢:~ P(c I . . . .  ,C,,)E.//L and E(ci) E ~L ,  i = 1 . . . . .  n . 
For an arbitrary closed 4,, truth in A//, is defined in the usual way (e.g. see Lloyd [31]). 
4. A,/L is a transparent Herbrand model of ~ if every function symbol of ~ is transparen! 
with respect o .//L. 
Intuitively, we may think of a Herbrand model as a set of KB-tuples, i.e. a single KB state. 
If we would want to describe the true facts in a Herbrand model by a theory, we would need 
a completion axiom for each predicate, stating that all and only the true facts in the 
Herbrand model are derivable (Reiter [44]). In our model-theoretic view, the above truth 
definition plays an analogous role, for it says that all and only the tuples in the Herbrand 
model are true. 
Our condition on the E predicate in the truth definition plays the role of "meaning 
postulate" for the existence predicate. If a tuple is in the extension of a predicate, then the 
constants in the tuple exist. 
Definition 10. An $5 Herbrand-Kr ipke structure ~L of a language L is a collection of 
transparent Herbrand models of L which are called the worlds or states of ~/'/. Truth of a 
ground atom in ~'/'/. is defined as 
A 
~rt. ~ P(c, . . . . .  c , , )¢~w~ P(c, . . . . .  c,)  for all wE , l l  . 
Truth of a closed formula 4~ in ~/~ is then defined in the usual way. The collection of all 
Herbrand-Kripke structures of L is called ~. 
We choose an $5 Kripke model because 'we ar~Yonly interested in the set of possible worlds 
and not in a reachability relation on these worlds. Later, we introduce actions with which we 
can specify state transitions between worlds. 
We will drop the qualification "$5" from the definition from now on. A Herbrand-Kripke 
structure may be thought of as the collection of all possible KB states. This collection is the 
state space through which the KB moves during its existence. 
Herbrand-Kripke structures are a particular formalization of our conception of model of 
Section 1. They function as the integrated prescriptive and descriptive model MA,~o of Figs. 
4 and 5 (prescriptive aspects will be added below). Each constant c denotes an object in a 
possible state of MA.~I), and in each possible world w of the structure the existence predicate 
E denotes the set of existing objects in that world. 
Static KB theories 
Definition 11. The theory T of ~t E ~ is the set of sentences (closed formulas) which are true 
in X/. 
Note that a theory of ~ is just a set of IC's of X/. They are necessary truths of the states of 
~ ,  so ground atoms, which usually express contingent facts, are usually not part of a theory 
of ~ .  Our theories are thus different from Reiter's [44] theories, which describe a single 
state of our model and contain precisely the ground atoms which express the contingent facts 
of that state. 
We now distinguish a number of sets of sentences which are true in models as we have 
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defined them. Some of these sentences are adaptions of Reiter's [44] well-known closure 
axioms to Kripke-structures. 
Proposition 12. Given a language L and a model ~t E ~ which represents a UoD, a KB 
theory T of  ~l consists at least of  the following sentences. 
1. FOL, the set of  all theorems of  first order predicate logic, 
2. HB, a set of  closure and equality sentences given below, 
3. D a set of  sentences called a domain theory. While FOL and HB are shared by all 
models of  all UoD's, D states truths about a particular model of  a particular UoD. The 
sentences of  D are called IC's. 
HB consists of  the following sentences. 
1. A domain closure sentence '¢x(x = cm v x = c 2 v . . . ) ,  where all and only the constants of  
L appear among the c i. 
2. Unique name sentence -a(c i = c2)for all constants c~ and cj, i # j. 
3. Equality sentences 
3.1. Vx(x= x). 
3.2. Vx, y(x = y ==> y= x). 
3.3. Vx, y, z(x = y ^ y = z ==> x = z). 
4. For each predicate P a substitution sentence V~, f (P (~)^x l=y I ^ ' "  A X ,= 
y, =~ P( f ) ) ,  where ~ = x i , . . . ,  x,  and f = y ! . . . .  , Y,,. 
5. For each unary predicate, excluding E and type predicates, the existence sentence for an 
n-ary predicate P, 
WxP(xl , .  . . , x, ) :~ E(xl)  ^ " "  ^ E(x , ) .  
Proof. FOL is in any T, and the other sentences are true by our Herbrand construction and 
truth definition. [] 
Comments: 
1. The domain closure sentence says that we chose our objects from the Herbrand 
universe of L, so that in the tuples of a KB we will find any constants from L. The 
unique name sentence says that different names name different objects and the equality 
sentences state the equivalence properties of --, which follow from the semantics of the 
= symbol as identity of names. The substitution sentence says that = is a congruence 
with respect o the predicate symbols and follows from the interpretation of - as 
identity. 
2. Note that the domain closure sentence is infinitely long, so that our language is actually 
Lo, m.~. Cf. Maibaum et ai. [32], where the domain closure sentence is called a 
namability axiom. 
3. Reiter [44] also has predicate completion axioms, which for each predicate state that a 
particular set of constants is precisely the extension of that predicate. Obviously, no 
such sentence is true in our Kripke structure, for in different states of the structure a
predicate will have different extensions. Our definition of truth in a state of the 
structure plays the role of predicate completion in that state, for it says for each 
predicate that there is a set of tuples of constants (i.e. nameable objects) which is 
precisely the extension of that predicate. 
4. If we want to reason about the model we use the derivation rule of FOL, modus 
ponens, as a derivation rule, 
MP 
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5. To show that a KB theory is satisfiable, we construct a universe from the constants in 
the language and define extensions of E and other predicates in different worlds of the 
structure. Appendix A shows briefly how this can be done. Note that in general, if a 
theory has a Herbrand model then it has a model, but only for theories in clausal form 
(universally quantified conjunctions of disjunctions, possibly with Skolem functions) the 
implication works the other way as well. A theory in clausal form has a Herbrand 
model if it has a model at all. Since we do not bother to put our theories in clausal 
form, we explicitly construct Herbrand models. 
We now distinguish the three different types of theories described in this paper. 
Definition 13. 
1. If L is Ls,a, and 
T= FOL U HB U D with 
D = Stat, 
where Stat is a set of sentences in Ls,a,, then T is called a static KB theory and D a static 
domain theory. The sentences in Stat are called static IC's. 
2. If L is Loy,, (the language defined in the next section) and 
T= FOL U HB U DL U D with 
DL = the set of axioms of dynamic logic introduced in the next section, 
D = Stat U Dyn, 
where Dyn a non-empty set of sentences in Lm.,,, then T is called a dynamic KB theory 
and D a dynamic domain theory. The sentences in Dyn are called dynamic IC's. 
3. if L is Lt,,.,,,, (detined in Section 2.4) and 
T= FOL U HB U DL U D with 
D = Smt tO Dyn U Deon, 
where Deon is a non-empty set of sentences in LD~o, , then T is called a deontic KB 
theory and D a deontic domain theory. The sentences in Deon are called deontic IC's. 
2.3. Dynamic necessary constraints 
We choose a variant of dynamic logic (DL, Harel [16]) to express dynamic constraints 
because this will allow us to express deontic constraints as well. Temporal ogic (TL), which 
has been used for dynamic constraint specification as well (Fiadeiro and Sernadas [11], 
Sernadas [48]), is too abstract for our purpose. It abstracts from the particular actions 
executed by a system and instead makes general statements about temporal properties of 
those actions. We want to be more specific than this and specify particular actions and how 
they are composed. 
For the same reason, temporal logic has a second drawback, which is that it is not 
compositional. To give a semantics to a TL formula in terms of the process which the 
formula is talking about, one must "unroll" the process and quantify over the objects 
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occurring in this unrolled process (e.g. Ehrich et al. [8], Lipeck & Saake [30]). If Ot and O2 
are two temporal ogic formulas interpreted in two processes, then if two processes are 
combined, e.g. in a parallel composition, the universe of objects into which the combined 
formula is interpreted iffers from the two universes into which each formula is interpreted 
separately. This means that we cannot simply compose the semantics of the separate 
formulas but must unroll the combined process anew. Compositionality is a basic de- 
sideratum for any formalism to reason about processes. The axioms of DL and TL are both 
syntax-directed in the sense that they are given by breaking down the syntactic strucure of a 
formula. But because the syntactic onstructs of DL formulas describe the composition 
operations of processes (e.g. sequential, alternative, parallel composition), DL is composi- 
tional with respect o processes. The syntactic onstructs of TL on the other hand do not 
correspond to composition operations on processes, which leads to the lack of com- 
positionality of TL. 
We start by defining a language for actions and then use this to extend the language Ls,a, 
to a dynamic language Loy,,. 
Actions 
We keep the language of actions as general as possible so as to accommodate diverse 
applications. We therefore assume a countable set A of unspecified primitive actions, with 
metavariable a (possibly subscripted) ranging over A. We build composite actions out of 
primitive actions as follows. 
Definition 14. The language LA, of actions~ with typical elements a, is given by the following 
BNF: 
a ::= a[a i U a2[t~ I & a2[¢~ [ any I fail 
where a E A. a I t3 a 2 is a non-deterministic choice of the actions al and a2; oq • a 2 is the 
parallel execution/performance of the actions a~ and a2; t~ is the non-performance of the 
action a; any denotes the unspecified action; fail denotes the failing (empty) action. 
Actions may change the world, and if they do, they do it instantaneously, i.e. there are no 
intermediate worlds during the execution of an action. The execution of an action is also 
called a step. If a UoD event spans a number of states, it must be represented by a 
transaction consisting of two or more steps (see below for transactions). In terms of our 
(Herbrand-)Kripke models, an action maps possible worlds to possible worlds, and an 
execution of an action in a world is the transition from that world to another world. The 
action fail has no successor worlds and the action any executed in a world has the worlds 
reachable by the execution of arbitrary atomic actions as successor. 
For a rigorous semantics of actions we refer to Meyer [35]. (See also appendix C for a 
synopsis.) For our purpose it suffices to give the following informal definition. 
Definition 15. Atomic actions a E A are interpreted as state transformers in the following 
sense '  
1. Given a state w in a Herbrand-Kripke structure ~L, we associate with each atomic 
action a E A a set Wa. w of reachable states (i.e. Herbrand models) in YIL, which is the 
set of states that can be reached by performing arbitrary actions that involve a as an 
element. (More precisely, we consider all subsets of A that contain a. These subsets are 
"packages" of elementary actions that are performed simultaneously.) The set of 
reachable states is thus the set of worlds which can be reached by performing one step 
involving an execution of a. 
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2. a t U % is interpreted as the set-theoretic union of the interpretations of a I and a2; this 
formalizes the lneaning of a choice of actions. 
3. a t & a 2 is interpreted as the set-theoretic intersection of the interpretations of al and if2, 
this formalizes the meaning of the simultaneous execution of actions. 
4. ti is interpreted as the set of states that are reachable by the collection of actions which 
do not involve a. (More precisely, we consider all subsets of A that do not contain a.) 
This formalizes the meaning of ti as the non-performance of an action. 
5. any is interpreted as the set of all possible worlds reachable in one step, and fail as the 
empty set. 
6. More complex compositions of actions are interpreted as follows: at U a 2 is interpreted 
as 6 t & 6 2, a~ & a 2 as 6 t LI 6 2, and a as a. Moreover, any = fail and fail = any. 
Remarks.  
1. Note that the interpretation of d is not the set-theoretic complement of the interpreta- 
tion of a, but the set-theoretic union of interpretations of all one-step actions not 
containing a. 
2. The domain of interpretation of La ,  is a Boolean algebra with respect o U, &, and -, 
with fail as zero and any as unit. 
Actions are instantaneous in that they have a duration of one step. Transactions, on the 
other hand, can take more steps because they consist of sequences of actions. 
Definition 16. The language Lr,a,,~ of transactions, with typical elements/3, is given by the 
BNF: 
/3 ::= al/3t; ~2lclock 
where a ~ L A,. t. 
Intuitively,//I;/32 is the sequential composition of the transactions//I and/32 and dock is a 
transaction of the duration of one time unit. We assume that a time unit has been chosen for 
the UoD, giving an intuitive interpretation to one tick of the clock. If the time unit is one 
day, then dock is the passing of one day, if the unit is one minute, then clock is the passing 
of one minute. During a tick of the clock, any is executed one or more times. 
Definition 17. 
1. Given a state w in a Herbrand-Kripke structure ~/'t., and a set W#~ w which can be 
reached from w by//t, then//t; f12 is interpreted as set-theoretic union of the sets Wa:,w, 
for w'~ Wt. 
2. The transaction clock is interpreted as 
clock = any"- ~; inc(t), 
where n is the number of steps needed to pass one time unit and inc(t) stands for the 
action which increments the value of the special variable t with 1. 
Definition 18. The following abbreviations are used: 
//n__a/3;... ;/3 (n times) 
A 
aen )=clock n', a (note: t~¢0 ) -= a) 
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A 
Ot(<~d) = ~(0)  U • • • U a(d  ) 
_ A 
a(,,) = clock"; & 
A _ 
a (>d)  - -  a{~<d ) - -  t~(O ) ¢~ . . . (~  t~(d ) 
Thus, in a library administration where return is the action of returning a book and the time 
unit is one calendar week, ret:.,,rn(<_3) is the action of returning the book at the latest 3 weeks 
after now (=the moment hat returnt~3) is executed), return(3 ) is the action of not returning 
the book in the third week from now, and return(>3) is the action of returning the book in the 
fourth week from now or later. 
Dynamic constraints 
We now extend Lst, t to LDy .. The language we define below is a variant of what is called 
PDL (Propositional Dynamic Logic) in the literature (Harel [16]). 
Definition 19. The language Loy . of dynamic constraints, with typical elements ¢) and qt, is 
given by the BNF: 
: :=  ^ ~ cl,2l[13l¢,lDONE: 
where ~b is a formula of Lst,, and a (~ LAc,. 
A dynamic constrain (a formula in LDy,) is thus a static constraint, or a logical combination 
of dynamic constraints, or has the form [f l ]~ or DONE: a. [/3]¢) is true in all those states 
where execution of transaction /3 necessarily leads to a state where dynamic constraint 
holds. It is thus the weakest precondition of fl with respect o the postcondition ¢). DONE: t~ 
expresses that the action ot has been performed. It is true in all worlds where a has just been 
performed. 
We use 
as an abbreviation of -a [ /3 ]-a ¢), read intuitively as the statement that the execution of 
transaction/3 may lead to a state where 4) holds. Again, for a formal semantics we refer to 
Meyer [35], [to appear]. Here, we limit ourselves to the following. Remember that ~ is the 
set of alJ $5 Herbrand-Kripke structures of L. 
Definition 20. Let w E ~//'~ • ~t)y,. Then w satisfies [/3] 4), written w ~ [/3 ] O, iff 
w' ~ • for every w' E Y/'~ such that the execution of/3 in w yields w' .  
By construction of our class of models ~Dy. and the above truth definition, we know that a 
number of sentences are true in all models in ~t,y,. 
Proposition 21. Given a model ~l E ~t)yn, a theory T of  ~ has the structure T = FOL U 
HB U DL U D, where FOL and HB are as in proposition 11, D is a dynamic domain theory 
and DL is the set 
DLI => => 
DL2 [a, U a2]¢ )¢:> [a~]¢) ^  [a2]¢) 
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DL3 [a, & ot2]OCC,[a,I(DONE: a ,~O)  
DL4 [(a, t,3 a..)]O ¢:~[6, & 6210 
DL5 [(a, & u 
DL6 [fail] • ¢O true 
DL7 [fl,; &lO  [13,l([ 2lO) 
DL8 DONE:  (a I U a2)¢:> DONE:  a t v DONE:  ol 2 
DL9 DONE:  (a I & a2)¢~ DONE:  a ! ^ DONE:  ot 2 
DL10 DONE:  5 <=~-a DONE:  a 
D L 11 DONE:  any ¢:~ true 
DL12 DONE:  fail ¢=> false 
DL13 [a ]DONE:  ot 
DL14 [a, IO =:>[a2I(DONE: oq :::> O ) 
DL15 t = n =:), (clock)t = n + 1 
Proof. Intuitively, this follows from the semantics in Definitions 14 and 16. For a rigorous 
proof, see Meyer [35]. [] 
Remarks 
1. The axioms are schemata, to be instantiated fG, each metavariable a , /3 , . . . ,  O, 
2. DL2 says that a nondeterministic choice between at and a 2 is guaranteed to lead to • 
iff both a t and a 2 necessarily lead to O. 
3. DL3 holds because actions are instantaneous. If actions would have a duration of more 
than one step, then DL3 would hold only if a~ and a 2 have the same duration. 
4. Note that we do not have an axiom that relates [5]O and [a]O in some way. In general 
there is no such relation. However, DL4 and DL5 indicate how [5]O should be 
evaluated for the non-basic ases in which ot is a choice or parallel execution. 
5. DL6 is valid because • is vacuously true after the performance of fail, because fail has 
no successor states. 
6. DL14 is valid because if ot ! necessarily leads to O, then if any action a 2 has been 
performed, • holds if a~ has been performed as well. 
7. In DL15 t is a distinguished variable which is increased by 1 every time the clock ticks. 
We intuitively interpret his as real time. Real time is included in order to express 
obligations in deontic constraints (this is explained in the next section). 
8. If we want to reason about dynamic IC's, we use the derivation rules 
MP 
N • 
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Rule N should be distinguished from the formula ~ => [a]O, which is not valid in 
general. This formula expresses that • is an invariant under the execution of a, while N 
merely expresses that a valid formula • holds everywhere, so also after the perfor- 
mance of a. 
For DL to be true in our model, we must require that atomic actions are unique in the 
sense that every atomic action leaves a unique marking in the world immediately 
resulting from its execution, such that it can be uniquely determined whether the action 
has just been performed. We do this by means of the predicate DONE:  or, which is true 
in worlds which result from the execution of a and false in other worlds. (So in 
practice, several occurrences of the "same" atomic action must be labeled in order to 
distinguish them.) 
We left open the structure of the set A of primitive actions. Usually primitive actions will be 
parameterized, so that executions with different actual parameters will have different effects 
on the state of the world. For example, let Salary(e, n) express that employee has salary n, 
then 
SO VEe, s, n(Salary(e, s):=~ [change - salary(e, n)]Salary(e, s + n)) . 
says that for each value of e and n, change - salary(e, n) is a primitive action which has the 
effect of adding n to the salary of e. Note that the effect of the action is only defined for 
existing objects. H~ We can add typing information to the axiom as a precondition, 
$1 VEe, s, n(Emp(e) A Money(n) A Salary(e, s) ~ [change - salary(e, n)] 
Salary(e, s + n)) . 
Alternatively, we can add the axiom 
VEe, s, n(Salary(e, s) =:~ Emp(e)  ^  (Money(s)) 
and omit typing information from the dynamic axiom. 
2.4. Deontic constraints 
The deontic concepts of obligation and permission can be reduced to the concept of 
prohibition, which in turn can be reduced to the concept of an action leading to a violation of 
a rule. Instead of expressing the rules explicitly, we thus state when they are violated. We do 
this by defining, for each action a, one or more violation states V~: t~, one for each of the 
reasons why the execution of a is forbidden. For each violation predicate, we usually define 
a corrective action which allows one to get out of a state in which that predicate is true. 
Definition 22. The language LDeon of deontic constraints is an extension of LDy n with a 
distinguished set of predicates, called violation predicates, of the form V~: a, where a E A 
and i is a natural number. 
Definition 23. The following abbreviations are used. 
A 
F(a)C~[alVi: a for an i ,  
~°Note also the slight abuse of syntax in that we quantify over action parameters. 
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A 
P(a)¢~"-I F(a) and 
, l 
F(a) is pronounced "or is forbidden", P(a) is pronounced "a  is permitted", and O(a) is 
pronounced "a  is obligatory." 
We thus consider an event forbidden if it necessarily eads to a violation state of that action. 
The reduction of prohibitions to actions has been first proposed by Anderson [1] and has 
been first formalized in the context of dynamic logic by Meyer [35]. The use of dynamic logic 
enables the separation of actions from states, which allows one to solve numerous paradoxes 
of deontic logic (Meyer [34, 35]). 
An action is permitted iff it is not forbidden, which is equivalent to saying 
P(a)¢~ (a) -aV:  a. An action is permitted if there is at least one instance of doing it which 
leads not to a state of violation. Finally, an action is obligatory iff not doing it is prohibited, 
i.e. iff [5]V: 6. 
Note that there is a practical difference between a prohibition and an obligation. The 
violation of a prohibition can be observed immediately: if one is forbidden to steal a book 
from a library, the violation of this prohibition can be established as soon as theft is 
committed. On the other hand, when one is obliged to return a book borrowed from a 
library, the violation of such an obligation cannot be determined when no term is set in 
which the performance of the obliged action, cq. the return of the book, has to occur. 
Therefore, in our examples, we shall only use obligations which must be fulfilled within a 
specific interval of time after the obligation is incurred. 
An example of a deontic axiom is 
$2 Vr'e, s, n(Salary(e, s) A n > s ~ [salary - change(e, n)]Vt: salary - change(e, n)) . 
This axioms says that it is forbidden to double a salary in one action. If such an action is 
attempted, a violation state is entered. Note that the action parameters are also parameters 
of the violation state, so that sufficient information is available for a corrective action. 
Assuming that S1 is also present, execution of salary-change(e~,lO00) in state 
Salary(et,300) leads to a state Salary(e t, 1300) a Vt: salary-  change(e t, 1000). A possible 
corrective action to this state could be 
$3 Salary(e, s) A VI : salary - change(e, n) ~ [salary - change(s, -n)l'~Vt: 
salary - change(e, n) . 
Sl guarantees that after this corrective action the salary has been changed appropriately. 
Using violation states, one has the choice of modeling rules for the UoD as necessary 
truths or as deontic constraints. For example, if a bank account may not be negative, we can 
represent this in the domain theory in one of the following two ways: 
AI.1 
AI.2 
or  
A2.1 
A2.2 
Balance(a, n) A n + m < O~ [update - balance(a, m)]Balance(a, n) 
Balance(a, n) A n + m >~O~ [update - balance(a, m)]Balance(a, n + m) 
Balance(a, n )~ [update - balance(a, m)]Balance(a, n + m) 
Balance(a, n) ^  -aV: update-  balance(a, mt)  ^  n + m 2 <O~[update -  
balance(a, m2) ] V: update - balance(a, m~ 
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A2.3 
A2.4 
Balance(a, n) A V: update - balance(a, ml )  A n + m 2 <O==)>[update - 
balance(a, m2) ] V: update -  balance(a, m I + m2) 
Balance(a, n) A V: update - balance(a, mi )  ^ n + m 2 >>-O==)>[update - 
balance(a, m2)]'-aV: update -  balance(a, m I ) 
A1 never allows a balance to drop below zero, A2 allows it to drop below zero (A2.1) but 
signals that this is a violation state when it occurs (A2.2), remembers the extent of the 
violation (A2.3) and provides a way of correcting it (A2.4). 
In practice, banks combine A1 and A2 by allowing an account o be negative but not less 
than a certain amount. In that case A2.2 and A2.3 are modified by adding the test 
Permissible - overdraw(a,  o) ^ o < n + m ! as a precondition and adding A3: 
A3 Balance(a, n) A Permissible - overdraw(a, o) A n + m < o ==)> [update - balance(a, m)] 
Balance(a, n) A O(refuse(a,  m))  . 
refuse(a, m)  is the explicit action of refusing an account update. 
We end by making some philosophic observations about the system Deon. First, note that 
there are three important reductions in the system, which need not he made at the same 
time. The first reduction is that of deontic logic to dynamic logic. Given this reduction, we 
can distinguish between actions and states and make the second reduction to reduce 
prohibitions, which are properties of actions, to violations, which are properties of states. It 
is this second choice which makes our system a reductionistic value system (cf. Huisjes [23]). 
Another choice would have been possible, in which an action is not forbidden because it 
leads to punishment, but because it is intrinsically bad. For example, it may be forbidden 
because the scripture says it is one of a set of prohibited actions, or because it contradicts the 
golden rule "do as thou would be done to," or because it is not performed in the proper 
way. In all these cases, prohibition is a property of the action itself and not of the state 
resulting from the action. 
Independently of the first two choices, we can thirdly choose to reduce nonpermissions to 
prohibitions. This choice results in a closed value system, by which is meant hat every action 
is deontically determined: for each a, 
F-Pe v Fe. 
This is not a default assumption about which of the true is true, Pa or Fa. Addition of such 
an assumption would lead to nonmonotonic phenomena (e.g. Etherington [9]). 
We now have a formalism to ~pecify models of descriptive as well as prescriptive aspects of 
the UoD (Fig. 4). In this formalism all deontic formulas are necessary truths, as required by 
definition 2, but prohibitions can be violated, as required in Section 1.3. 
3. Conclusion 
In Chapter 1 we distinguished necessary from empirical ~nd deontic onstraints. Empirical 
constraints, if formulated weak enough, can for the purpose of KB design be treated as 
necessary constraints. Deontic constraints, on the other hand, cannot be treated this way. 
Violation of a deontic onstraint does occur in the UoD and must be represented by the KB. 
Violation of analytical and suitably chosen empirical constraints i impossible in the KB and, 
when they occur in the implementation, are errors of the implementation of the KB. 
Addition of deontic aspects to the KB adds a new dimension to modeling because we now 
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have descriptive as well as prescriptive aspects in one model. In Chapter 2, a particular 
formalism for describing necessary as well as deontic truths about he UoD was presented. In 
general, the deontic variant of dynamic logic has the merits that it avoids certain paradoxes 
in deontic logic. For the specification of KB's it has the additional advantage of allowing to 
specify static, dynamic and deontic constraints in a single coherent framework. 
The implementation f integrity constraints i not covered in this paper. An attempt o 
implement a conceptual language that includes deontic operators is reported in (Dignum et 
al. [7]). In this implementation, a distinction is made between deontic constraints whose 
satisfaction can be enforced by the system and those which cannot be so enforced. For 
example, a bank account system can enforce the constraint that a client is not allowed to 
withdraw any money from an account when the balance has fallen below a certain negative 
amount, but it cannot enforce the obligation that the customer must pay in sufficient money 
for the balance to be positive again. 
Dynamic logic has been applied to database specification (as opposed to conceptual 
modeling of a UoD) by Casanova nd Bernstein, who use it to prove properties of data 
manipulation programs. It has been used by Khosla et ai. [24], who use a many-sorted 
variant of dynamic logic to specify dynamic integrity constraints. 
The distinction between ecessary and deontic constraints, and within deontic constraints 
between enforcable and non-enforcable constraints, is also made in the ISO report on 
conceptual schema terminology (Griethuysen [15], Section 2.5). However, the ISO report 
does not use the results of contemporary analytic philosophy to explicate these concepts 
clearly and offers no logic to express the different ypes of constraint, as we do (cf. Hospers 
[21], Moser [37], Munitz [38]). 
Deontic logic is used by Lee [20] to specify obligations, prohibitions and permissions in an 
office environment. Lee also stresses the performative aspects of office information systems. 
However, he employs a deontic logic based on Anderson's reduction to alethic modal logic 
(Anderson [1], Hilpinen [19,20]), which has been shown by McArthur [33] to contain a 
number of paradoxes. The deontic variant of dynamic Ic.gic which we use does not suffer 
from these paradoxes (Meyer [34° 35]) and has the added ~.dvantage that it can be embedded 
smoothly in our language for dynamic onstraints. 
One topic left open in our research is the inheritance of constraints in taxonomic 
hierarchies. Are all prohibitions, permissions and obligations of members of a superclass also 
prohibitions, permissions and obligations of members of a subclass? Does a manager have 
more or less obligations than an employee? 
A second cluster of open problems circles around constraint satisfiability. The satisfiability 
problem for IC's is the question 
1. Is there a non-empty set of closed Herbrand models uch that all axioms of the domain 
theory are satisfied in that set? 
More interesting questions for KB modeling are 
2. Is there a model such that in each world there is at least one executable action, i.e. an 
action leading to an empty world? If not, there are "black holes," worlds from which 
there is no escape. 
3. For each action, is there a world in which it can be executed? If not, the action is 
redundant. 
4. For each predicate, is there a world in which it has a non-empty extension? If not, the 
predicate is redundant. 
5. For any world in which at least one violation predicate has a non-empty extension, is
there an action applicable which will diminish this extension? If not, some violations, 
once committed, cannot be undone. 
We play to tackle these questions in the future. 
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Appendix A. A supplier KB 
This small example is taken from Nicolas [40], who borrowed it from Chang [6]. The UoD 
consists of a department which buys items from companies and sells them to other parties. 
Notational convention: Some unary predicates are set apart as type predicates. For each 
type predicate, we declare a typical variable and use this variable in the formulas with the 
understanding that it is of this type. For example, if p is the typical variable of predicate P, 
then 
Vp(tb(p)) stands for Vp(P(p)~ tb(p)) and 
3p(dp(p)) stands for 3p(P(p) ^  ~(p)). 
The IC's are a set of formulas D which are axioms of a domain theory in a language with the 
following signature. 
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Signature 
Constants: 
guns, bullets, I, C, T~, T 2, T 3, T4,. . .  
Type predicates: (For each type predicate a typical variable is given.) 
Comp(c), c is a company. 
Dept(d), d is a department. 
Item(i), i is an item. 
Type(t), t is the type of an item. 
Emp(e), e is an employee. 
Other predicates: 
E(x), x exists. 
Mng(m), m is a manager. 
Class(i, t), t is the type of item i. 
Subord(e~, e2), employee m is a subordinate of employee 2. 
Note that Mng is not a type predicate. It is not a type of object but a role an employee 
object can play. All possible employees are possible managers, but employees are not 
necessarily created in a world as managers. This difference between Emp and Mng will 
become explicit in the dynamic specification. We give two domain theories, one static and 
one dynamic, which share the following static axioms in Star. 
Static necessary constraints 
IC0 Item(guns), Item(bullets), Item(l), Comp(C), Type(T~),... 
IC1 Vi, t(Class(i, t)==> Item(i) ^  Type(t)) 
IC2 Vm( Mng(m) ==> Emp(m)) 
IC3 Ve I, e2(Subord(e l, e2) =:> Emp(el) A Emp(e2) ) 
IC4 Veel., e 2, es(Subord(e I, e2) A Subord(e , e3) ~ Subord(e i, e3) 
Remarks 
1. There are infinitely many constants. In each world, each predicate has a finite extension 
but since there are infinitely many possible worlds with different constants in the 
extension of E, there must be infinitely many constants. IC0 therefore is an infinite list 
of axioms. 
2. IC0-1C3 are type axioms. If we would exclude these, we would allow the a0dition of 
facts like Mng(d) for a department d.
3. IC2 defines the generalization relation between employees and managers. 
4. IC4 and 5 explicate the meaning of Subord. Note that in IC5 we must restrict 
quantification to existing objects. 
We first give a static domain theory, modeled on Nicolas' solution. 
A.1 Static domain theory 
We have the following extra predicates. 
Supply(c, d, i), company c supplies department d with item i (in the progressive sense, as in 
"they supply us with bicycle parts.") 
Sale(d, i), department d sells item i (as in "shop X sells bicycle parts.") 
V~ (d, i), department d sells item i without there being a supplier for i. 
V2(d, s, i), another company than C supplies T 4 items. 
V3(c ) company c supplies guns but no bullets. 
The following two type axioms for these predicates are to be added as static necessary 
constraints in Stat: 
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IC6 Vc, d, i(Supply(c, d, i) ::) Comp(c) ^  Dept(d) ^  Item(i)) 
IC7 Vd, i(Sale(d, i):~ Dept(d) ^  Item(i)) 
The following static deontic constraints are to be added to Deon: 
IC8 If department d sells item i, there should be a supplier s for it: 
Ved, i(=ies(Sale(d, i):~ Supply(s, d, i)¢~"aVl(d, i))) 
IC9 Only company C supplies type T 4 items: 
Ves, d, i((Supply(s, d, i) ^ Type(i, T4) ::> s = C)¢:~-1VE(d, s, i)) 
IC10 Each company which supplies guns also supplies bullets: 
Vec, d((Supply(c, d, guns):~ Supply(c, d, bullets))C:~-a V3(c)) 
Nicolas presents these constraints as necessary truths, while they are deontic constraints 
here, defining when the domain is in a violation state. However, this solution is clearly 
deficient because we have no way to state how to get out of a violation state, not how we got 
there in the first place. We now give a dynamic solution to solve this. 
A.2 Dynamic domain theory 
Interpreting Supply and Sale as progressive verbs, we must introduce the start and stop of 
the state introduced by the verb and denote the state itself by the -ing form of the verb. 
start-supplying(c, d, i), company c starts to supply department d with item i. 
stop-supplying(c, d, i). 
start-selling(d, i), department d starts to sell item i. 
stop-selling(d, i ) 
Supplying(c, d, i), company c is supplying department d with item i. 
Selling(d, i), department d is selling item i. 
In order to be able to give an interesting model of the specification (to show its 
satisfiability, we can come up with quite trivial models) we introduce events which create 
objects in the extension of the predicates: 
create.comp(c), reate a company. 
create-dept(d), create a department. 
create-item(i, t), create an item of type t. 
create-type(t), create a type. 
create.emp(e), create an employee. 
create.rang(m), create a manager. 
become-rang(e), become a manager. 
The domain theory now gets a non-empty dynamic part as follows. 
Necessary dynamic onstraints 
Instead of adding IC6 and IC7 to Stat, we add the following axioms to Dyn: 
IC l l  
IC12 
IC13 
IC14 
IC15 
IC16 
IC17 
IC18 
IC19 
IC20 
IC21 
V c(Comp( c ) ==~ [ create-comp( c)]E( c )). 
Vd(Dept(d) ~ [create-dept(d)E(d)). 
Vi, t(ltem(i) A TyFe(t )=)[create-item(i, t)]E(i) ^  Class(i, t)). 
V t( Type( t ) ==> [ create-type(t ) ] E(t ) ). 
V e(Emp( e) ~ [ create-emp( e ) ]E( e ) ). 
Ve(Emp(e) => [create-mng(e)]E(e) ^ Mng(e)). 
V~e(Emp(e) =~ [become-mng(e) ]Mng(e)). 
VEc, d, i(Comp(c) ^  Dept(d) ^  Item(i)~[start-supplying(c, d, i)]Supplying(c, d, i)) 
V%,d,i(Comp(c) ^Dept(d) ^  Item(i)==~ ([start-supplying(c, d, i)]-aSupplying(c, d i)) 
t VEd, i( Dept(d) ^  Item(i) ^  E(d) ^  E(i) ~ ~[Start-selling(d, i)]selling(d, i)) 
VEd, i( Dept(d) ^  Item(i)==)([stop-selling(d, i)]-aselling(d, i)) 
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Remarks. 
1. Note that in the creation constraints ICl l - IC16 we quantify over all possible objects, 
whereas in other dynamic constraints we quantify only over existing objects. Events 
that change a state, only change the state of existing objects. 
2. Items are created with a type. Types of items may be created without there being an 
item of that type. 
3. Mng is a role of Emp objects. Employees can be created manager or can become 
manager. 
4. We did not specify of whom an m becomes manager. The predicate Subord will thus 
have no extension in models of our specification, but this can be remedied by adding 
axioms stating when an employee is a subordinate of another employee. 
5. For actions the notational convention to indicate the type of their arguments does not 
hold. We therefore give the type of definitions of their arguments and preconditions. 
6. IC18 ar, d IC19 are the dynamic versions of IC1 and IC20 are dynamic versions of IC3. 
Dynamic deontic constraints 
The following axioms replace IC8-10 of the static version of Deon. 
If department d sells item i, there should be a supplier s for it. 
IC20 red, i(-a Supplying(s, d, i)==> F(start-seUing(d, i)) 
IC21 red, i(V: start-selling(d, i)==~ [stop-selling(d, i)]--aV: start-selling(d, i)) 
Only company C supplies type T 4 items: 
IC22 VEC, d, i(c ~ C ^ Class(i, T4) ==> F(start-supplying(c, d, i)) 
IC23 VEC, d, i([stop-supplying(c, d, i)]-aV: start-supplying(c, d, i)) 
Each company which supplies guns also supplies bullets: 
IC24 VEc, d([start-supplying(c, d, guns)& start-supplying(bullets)]V : start-suppl.ving- 
(c, d, guns)) 
IC25 VEc, d(V: start-supplying(c, d, guns) =:> [start-supplying(c, d, bullets)]'aV : start- 
supplying(c, d, guns)) 
IC26 V%, d(V: start-supplying(c, d, guns)=~[stop-supplying(c, d, guns)]-aV: start-supply- 
ing(c, d, guns)) 
IC27-29 Idem with guns and bullets interchanged 
This example shows that in the dynamic specification, we are t:orced to be more precise than 
in the ~.:,~i~. specification, because we must specify how we reach a forbidden state and how 
we get out oi i t  In general, a forbidden state arises because an event occurs under specific 
preconditions. For each event/condition pair, we must remember the combination in the 
forbidden state in order to be able to get out of the forbidden state in the proper way. 
To specify a model for this domain theory, we can start with an initial world w 0 in which 
the predicates have the following extensions: all type predicates have their constants in their 
extension and all other predicates have an empty extension. Thus, [EmPLo = {e~, e2,...} 
= ~ etc. A Herbrand model containing w 0 as its ,,...s""~ . . . . . . .  ,,,,,.,.~a ,,,,~,,o, easily be etc. and [ELo 
shown to satisfy all axioms in the domain theory. This is sufficient o show that the domain 
theory T is satisfiable. 
Appendix B. A Library KB 
The UoD of this example is a library which contains 2000 works and has 750 members. A
member can borrow or return one or several warks by applying to one of the library wickets. 
S/he also has the possibility to reserve awork if none of its copies are available. In that case, 
his or her reservation is placed at the end c.f a queue of reservations made for the same 
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work. As soon as a copy is returned, the first member in the queue is informed that the work 
is available. The book is then kept during one week for this member, after which it is free 
again to be borrowed by the next member in the queue or, if the queue is empty, by any 
member of the library. 
A library member cannot have more than 3 books at a time and each loan has to be 
returned at the end of 3 weeks. If the book is not returned, the library will send a reminder. 
As long as the book is not returned, the member cannot borrow other works. The charge for 
returning a book too late is $2. 
Signature 
Constants: {Self, $2, B1, B2 , . . . ,  B2ooo, P~, P2 , . . . ,  P75o, 0, 1, 2, 3 , . . .}  
Type predicates (for each type predicate a typical variable is given): 
Natural(n), n is a natural number 
Person(p) ,  p is a person 
Library(l) ,  l is a library 
Book(b) ,  b is a book 
Money(m) ,  m is an amount of money 
Other predicates: 
Available(b), b is not borrowed and not reserved 
Present(b), b is not borrowed 
Member (p) ,  p is a member of the library 
First-reserver(p, b), p is the first member in the queue of reservations for b 
PERF:  borrow(p,  b )p  has borrowed the book (and not returned it yet) 
Queue(p ,  b, n), p has number n in the queue of reservers of b 
V: a for each of the actions below 
Functions: 
max(x,  y), a function which gives the maximum of two numbers. 
Actions: (We use the convention that the agent of an action, if there is any, is the first 
argument of the action and is separated from the other arguments by a semicolon). 
borrow(p;  b), p borrows b 
return(p; b ) , p returns b 
reserve(p; b), p reserves b 
notify(I; p, b), the library notifies p that b is available 
pay(p ;  m, b), p pays m concerning a book b 
If X = {x[P(x)} and x E X is another way of writing P(x), we use the following abbreviations 
for cardinality of X in a world, 
A E 
card(X) = ¢:~ 3 .x  • X .  
3.~x E X means that there are precisely n different elements in X, 
3e.xPx ¢~ 
3Eyl,  . . . , y , :  y~ ~.  . . (pairwise) . . . ~ y ,  ^ VEx(Pxc~x = y~ v . . . v x= y . )  . 
Assuming that we start with an empty extension for E, are reachable worlds will have a finite 
extension for E, so that the existential quantifier in the last formula can be written as a finite 
disjunction. 
Necessary static constraints 
IC0 Library(Self) ,  Money(S2) , . . . ,  Book(B i ) ,  . . . , Natura l (O) , . . .  
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IC1 Vb (Available(b)goVp, n (Present(b)^ -TQueue(p, b,n)) 
IC2 Vpl, b (First-reserver(p 1, b)¢~ 
:in (Queue(pl, b, n) ^  Vp2 , n'(Queue(p2, b n' ) :~ n' = max(n', n)))) 
IC0 introduces the constants. It also specifies that the UoD is described from the perspective 
of the library. The constant Self has no special ogical meaning, but gets a special operational 
meaning when the specification is used as a prescription for the action component of the 
Library Information System. 
Necessary dynamic onstraints 
IC3 Vp, b DONE: borrow(p, b):=~ PERF: borrow(p, b) 
IC4 Vp, b PERF: borrow(p, b)==>[return(p; b)]PERF: borrow(p, b) 
IC5 Vp, b [return(p; b)]-TPERF: borrow(p, b) 
These axioms say that if a borrow action has been done, it has been performed (IC3), and 
that once it has been performed, it remains in the state of having been performed (IC4) until 
its effect is outdone (IC5). The return is a kind of inverse of borrow. The behavior of PERF: 
borrow contrasts with that of DONE: borrow, which is only true in worlds resulting from 
borrow and false in other worlds. In principle, inertia axioms like these can be given for each 
action, but we need only the ones for borrow. 
IC6 
IC7 
IC8 
IC9 
ICIO 
IC l l  
Vp, b ('T PERF: borrow(p, b)==> [return(p; b)]false) 
Vp, b ('7 Present(b) ==> [borrow(p; b)]false) 
Vp, b, n [borrow(p; b)](-7 Queue(p, b, n) A -aPresent(b)) 
Vp, b [return(p; b)]eresent(b) 
Vp, b(3n (Queue(p 1,b, n) ^  Vp2, n'(Queue(p 2,b, n')==> n = max(n', n)))) ~ 
[reserve(p; b)]Queue(p, b, n + 1)) 
Vp, b, n [notify(Self; p, b)][doekt7~]-TQueue(p, b, n) 
Remarks. 
1. IC6 and IC7 describe necessary preconditions. The other constraints all deal with the 
effects (postconditions) of actions. 
2. According to ICll ,  a reservation is automatically removed from the queue when 
someone has failed to come and borrow the reserved book. This is an application of the 
performative hypothesis. When the reservation is caacelled in the data base, it is 
cancelled in reality. Therefore we do not need an extra action "cancel.reservation". 
3. An implicit assumption of ICl l  is that the communication between library and 
members is perfect so that the act of sending a notification is equivalent o the act of 
notifying. 
Deontic constraints 
IC12 Vp, blP(borrow(p; bl))C~(Member(p) ,', "7 =lbeV: return(p, be) 
^ card({ b3[PERF: borrow(p, b30)}) < 3 
A ((Available(b1) v First-reserver(p, bl))) 
IC13 Vpl, b, n (P(reserve(pl; b))¢~ Member(p1) ^-T Available(b)) 
IC14 Vp, b [borrow(p; b)]O(return(p; b)~.~zl~) ) 
iCi5 Vp, b [borrow(p; b)l[doek m~] 
(PERF: borrow(p, b )~ O(remind(Self; p, b))) 
IC16 Vp, b (First-reserver(p, b)^ PreYent(b)=~ O(notify(Self; p, b))) 
IC17 Vp, b (V: return(p,b):~O(pay(p;$2, b)))
IC18 Vp, b [borrow(p; b)][eloekm~](PERF: borrow(p, b )~ V: return(p, b)) 
IC19 Vp, b [return(p; b)]-TV: return(p, b) 
IC20 Vp, b [pay(p; $2, b)]-TV: return(p, b) 
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Remarks. 
1. IC12 and IC13 define the permissions of the members of the library. IC12 says when it 
is permitted that someone borrows a book and IC13 says when it is permitted that 
someone reserves a book. Another reasonable permission would be that someone may 
only pay the library when he must pay: O(pay)¢¢, P(pay). However, this constraint was 
not in the original description. 
2. IC14-15 state several obligations. IC14 says that someone is obliged to return the book 
in three weeks (we assume the time unit of this UoD is one calendar day; see comment 
on definition 14). IC15 and IC16 state some obligations of the library: that the library 
should notify a reserver when the book becomes available and that it should send a 
reminder when a book is not returned in time. IC17 shows how the failure to perform 
an obliged action can lead to another obligation: if someone has not returned the book 
in time, he must pay a fine. 
3. IC18-IC20 describe postconditions of actions as far as liability is concerned. IC18 
specifies that someone is liable if he has not returned a book in time. This liability has 
some consequences (IC12: he cannot borrow a new book). Note that this liability is 
cancelled (IC19) as soon as he returns the book (be it too late). However, when he 
returns the book too late, he performs a forbidden action (IC14) which leads to another 
liability V: return(p, b). This liability is cancelled, according to IC20, when the 
offender pays a fine. 
That he performs a forbidden action when he returns the book too late, follows from 
O(return(p; b)(<_21d)) which is equivalent o F(return(p;b)(>2~d)), and this implies 
F(return(p; b)t,,)), for m > 21d. 
4. Note that the specification is not in all senses complete. For example, it is not said what 
happens when someone fails to pay the fine (IC17). 
Appendix  C. Formal  semantics of actions 
We give a simplified version of the general semantics in Meyer [35]. 
Note that A is the set of primitive actions (or rather primitive action symbols). We 
associate with each a E A a function 
p(a): yc, ---, yc,. 
describing a's behavior. We write p(A) for the set {p(a)la E A } of functions associated with 
A. 
Let ~+(p(A))  stand for the collection of finite nonempty sets of p(A). The formal 
semantics of LAc t is now given by a semantic function 
 (Y6 )). 
In order to define 1[. ]l, we first define an auxiliary function 
II. ]': Lac,-'-> ~(~ +(p(A))) 
as follows: 
Definition CI. 
1. ~a~'={SC_p(A)Ip(a)ES }. 
2. ~a, U %~' = Ua,~' U ~2~'. 
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3. ~,  & a2B' = ~,D' n ~a2D'. 
4. ~ '= ~ ÷(p(A))~[~n'. 
5. [[fail~' = i~. 
6. [any~' = ~+(p(A) ) .  
Remarks. 
1. expresses that the semantics of a is defined by all simultaneously performed "packages" 
that contain its (i.e. a's) behavior. Likewise 4. implies that the semantics of ti is determined 
by all simultaneously performed "packages" that do not contain a's behavior. 
Next we define an auxiliary function 
R: ~ ÷(p(A))-, (~, --, 0~(S~, )) 
as follows: 
Definition C2. 
Let S= {p(a l ) , . . . ,  p)(a,,)} C_ p(A), n ~> 1. Then 
R(S)= {(p(al)o" "'°p(aa))(w)} if p(a l ) , . . . ,  p(a,) are compatible for argument 
W, 
R( S) = fJ otherwise, 
where functions f l , . . . ,  fn: Y/L -'> Yf/. are compatible for w if ( f l ° ' " ° f , ) (w)=( f i l  °''" 
of,,)(w) for any permutation ( i l , . . . ,  i,,) of (1 , . . . ,  n). 
R is lifted to the domain ~h(~+(p(A)) in the usual way: let TC~+(p(A)) .  Then 
R(T)(w) = Us~T R(S)(w). 
Now we define our semantic function [. ]: LAc,--~ (~L ~ ~(Y/'~ )) by 
~-  ~w. R(H')(w).  
